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The Right to Venue and the Right to an
Impartial Jury: Resolving the Conflict in
the Federal Constitution
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires that federal criminal defendants be tried by "an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."1 In an ordinary criminal case, courts are able to ac-
commodate both the defendant's right to venue2 and his right to
an impartial jury by using such remedial measures as voir dire and
continuances. 3 If there has been extensive pretrial publicity, how-
ever, the risk of prejudice to the defendant in the district where
the crime was committed may be so great that these remedies are
inadequate to protect his right to an impartial jury.4 The Supreme
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Technically, the sixth amendment is a vicinage provision because it defines the geo-
graphical area from which the jury must be selected, while article III, section 2, clause 3 of
the Constitution, which guarantees a criminal defendant's right to trial "in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed," is a venue provision because it fixes the place
of trial. See 2 CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDuRE § 301, at 190 (2d ed.
1982). The Supreme Court, however, has held that the sixth amendment guarantees a fed-
eral criminal defendant's right to trial in the district where the crime was committed as well
as his right to a jury selected from that district. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351
U.S. 215, 220 (1956); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1924). This accords with the
framers' intention that the sixth amendment create a right to venue as well as a right to
vicinage. See FRANCIS HmLLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 93 (1951) ("[I]f the debates in the state conventions can be taken as typical, those
who clamored for more specific and narrowly defined criteria of vicinage were frequently
speaking in terms of venue, or at least they failed to distinguish clearly between vicinage
and venue, between origin of the jury and location of the trial."). But see Kershen, Vicinage
(pt. 1), 29 0KLA. L. REV. 801, 804 (1976) (arguing that the merger of these two concepts is
not an "accurate statement of the importance attached to the distinction between venue and
vicinage by the drafters" of the art. III provision and the sixth amendment). This comment
will refer to the sixth amendment as establishing a right to venue in the district where the
crime was committed.
' See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976) ("In the over-
whelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable threats
to [the right to an impartial jury]."); Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435, 435-38
(1965) (in most criminal cases, existing safeguards are sufficient to ensure that the defen-
dant's right to an impartial jury is not violated).
" See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1971) (remedies such as voir dire
and continuances may be inadequate "where, because of prejudicial publicity or for some
other reason, the community. . . may already be permeated with hostility toward the de-
fendant"); infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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Court has held that in such a situation the defendant is constitu-
tionally entitled to a change of venue whenever such a change is
necessary to ensure an impartial jury.5 A federal defendant con-
fronted with the risk of a partial jury usually waives his right to
venue by moving under Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure for a change of venue,6 but if he insists on both his
right to venue and his right to an impartial jury, these two rights
come into conflict.
This comment examines the problem that arises when a fed-
eral7 criminal defendant refuses to waive his right to venue in a
' See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1971) (holding that in some cases,
"only a change of venue [is] constitutionally sufficient to assure. . . [an] impartial jury");
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (discussed infra notes 23-26 and accompa-
nying text). Although both Rideau and Groppi in fact addressed the problem of when the
fourteenth amendment requires a state court to allow a change of venue, see Groppi, 400
U.S. at 510; Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27, the standards are the same for federal trials under
the sixth amendment, see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976);
United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1216 n.9 (8th Cir. 1984).
6 FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) provides in relevant part that "[t]he court upon motion of the
defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him to another district . . . if the court is
satisfied that there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so great a
prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial." By making
a motion under Rule 21(a) for a change of venue, a defendant waives his right to venue. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) advisory committee note; see also United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d
530, 537 (9th Cir. 1980) (constitutional right to venue is waivable).
7 State courts have also considered what remedy is appropriate when a defendant re-
fuses to waive his right to venue under a state constitution even though a change of venue is
necessary to assure an impartial jury. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 34-36, 139
N.W.2d 490, 513-15 (1966) (rejecting defendant's motion for a new trial even though over
60% of the prospective jurors expressed an opinion that the accused was guilty); Common-
wealth v. Douglas, 461 Pa. 749, 753, 337 A.2d 860, 862 (1975) (denying defendant's motion
for dismissal because "no jurisdiction ... has ever advocated quashing the indictment as a
remedy" for prejudicial pretrial publicity); State v. Holland, 261 S.C. 488, 494-95, 201
S.E.2d 118, 121-22 (1973) (rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss because there was no
motion for a change of venue); State ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff, 39 Wis. 2d 342, 352, 159
N.W.2d 25, 30-31 (1968) (holding that a defendant "cannot insist on a jury trial in the
county wherein the offense was committed and also claim the county is prejudiced"), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969); State v. Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 167-68, 142 N.W.2d 810,
818 (1966) (concluding that dismissal was unjustified because defendant had moved neither
for a continuance nor for a change of venue), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 386 U.S. 9
(1967).
The Supreme Court has incorporated the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial
jury into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see cases cited infra note 11,
but courts have generally not applied the sixth amendment right to venue to state criminal
proceedings, see, e.g., Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 325-26 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1083 (1981); State v. Byrnes, 260 Iowa 765, 768-69, 150 N.W.2d 280, 281-82 (1967);
People v. Lee, 334 Mich. 217, 224-25, 54 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1952); but see People v. Jones, 9
Cal. 3d 546, 551, 510 P.2d 705, 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1973) (holding that sixth
amendment venue provision is applicable to the states). The refusal to incorporate the sixth
amendment venue provision is not surprising, since the framers intended this provision to
apply to the federal judicial districts established by Congress. See, e.g., Zicarelli, 633 F.2d at
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case in which a change of venue is the only remedy that will pro-
tect his right to an impartial jury. At least one federal court has
held that, in this situation, the only proper remedy is to dismiss
the case." Most federal courts, however, have responded by, in ef-
fect, presuming that the jury in the district where the crime was
committed is impartial if the defendant refuses to move for a
change of venue.9 This comment offers an alternative resolution of
the conflict between the right to an impartial jury and the right to
venue, one that is suggested by the history and purposes of the
sixth amendment: in cases in which the defendant cannot be tried
by an impartial jury of the district yet refuses to move for a change
of venue, the court should order a change of venue to another
district.
Part I of this comment discusses the circumstances in which a
conflict may develop between a federal criminal defendant's right
to venue and his right to an impartial jury and then criticizes the
two ways in which courts have addressed this problem-dismissal
of the case and the presumption of impartiality in the venue. Both
of these approaches resolve the problem by assuming that the right
to venue is an absolute right that only the defendant can waive.
Part II examines the purposes underlying the sixth amendment
right to venue and argues that the framers did not intend a crimi-
nal defendant's right to venue to be so strictly construed; rather,
they intended that this right be conditioned on the government's
ability to try the defendant. In order to resolve this conflict, the
comment therefore proposes that in cases where a change of venue
is required to protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury but
the defendant refuses to move for a change of venue, the court
should order a change of venue to another district.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND His RIGHT TO VENUE
A. The Problem
The sixth amendment guarantees a federal criminal defendant
both the right to be tried by an impartial jury and the right to a
trial in the district where the crime was committed.10 Although the
325; Note, Change of Venue in Criminal Cases: The Defendant's Right to Specify the
County of Transfer, 26 STAN. L. REv. 131, 149 n.98 (1973). The scope of this comment will
be limited to this problem as it arises in federal courts.
S See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
'0 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (quoted in relevant part supra text accompanying note 1).
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degree of partiality necessary to violate the right to an impartial
jury cannot be defined with precision, the Supreme Court has held
that, at a minimum, this right requires a trial by "a panel of im-
partial, 'indifferent,' jurors" who will base their verdict solely ipon
the evidence presented at trial." Courts have used various devices,
principally voir dire and continuances, to ensure that juries im-
panelled in the district where the crime was committed are impar-
tial.12 The questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire is in-
tended to detect jurors who are biased against the defendant.13 A
continuance is also designed to aid in the selection of an impartial
jury-a delay in the trial may allow community prejudice against
the defendant to dissipate. 4
Although these remedies function well in ordinary criminal
cases,' 5 they may fail to protect a defendant's right to an impartial
jury in cases where there has been pervasive adverse pretrial pub-
licity.' 6 In such cases, voir dire may be ineffective in detecting bi-
ased'jurors either because of a potential juror's reluctance to admit
prejudice in court 17 or because of the difficulty of detecting uncon-
scious bias.' The grant of a continuance may also be insufficient to
11 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-23 (1961) (applying implicit fourteenth amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury); accord Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975).
12 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FAIR PRESS 120, 131 (Tent. Draft
1966) [hereinafter cited as FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS]; Sullivan, Prejudicial Publicity: A Look
at the Remedies, 1 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 77, 90-92 (1967).
In addition to continuances and voir dire, remedial measures include jury sequestration,
change of venue, severance of trials in which defendants are joined, closure, and restraining
orders restricting press coverage ("gag orders"). See generally FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS, supra,
at 68-78; Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review, 21 VILL. L. REV. 819,
822-36 (1976).
1'3 See, e.g., United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The purpose
of voir dire is to enable the defendant to evaluate the prospective jurors and select a fair
and impartial jury."); cf. STEPHEN SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 878 (2d ed.
1984) (purpose of voir dire "is to get a panel that is free of bias").
H4 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976) (continuance
"allow[s] public attention to subside"); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) (grant
of continuance may allow "the fires of prejudice" to cool).
15 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting);
FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 12, at 56-58; Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Em-
pirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 528 (1965); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 91-92, 95; Note,
Government Consent to Waiver of Jury Trial Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 65 YALE L.J. 1032, 1037 (1956).
's See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961); United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 227 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS,
supra note 12, at 61-64; Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against
Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1971); Comment, Fair Trial v. Free
Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be Impar-
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ensure that the defendant is tried by an impartial jury. If the con-
tinuance is granted only for a short period of time, it is unlikely to
eliminate community prejudice against the defendant;' 9 if it is
granted for an extended period of time, the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial20 may be violated before the
prejudice disappears.2
In cases where these remedies are inadequate to prevent the
selection of a partial jury, the Supreme Court has held that a de-
fendant has a constitutional right to move for a change of venue to
protect his right to an impartial jury.22 In Rideau v. Louisiana,23
for example, a film of the defendant's confession to a bank robbery
and the murder of one of the hostages was televised three times (to
audiences of 24,000, 53,000, and 29,000) shortly after the crime was
committed. Because there were only 150,000 residents in the
county where the crime was committed, the defendant moved for a
change of venue to another county within the state in order to en-
sure that he was tried by an impartial jury, but the state courts
rejected his motion.24 The Supreme Court reversed the state
courts' decision, holding that due process required a change of
venue in these circumstances. 25 The Court reasoned that where the
residents of the venue "had been exposed repeatedly and in depth
tial; A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 672, 684 (1965).
19 See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) (grant of continuance may
not diminish the prejudice against the defendant); Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal
Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 810, 821 (1961) (concluding that "delay
may not cause public feelings about a case to subside" and that "[e]ven if delay will cool
public sentiment, the press can fan the fires again when the delayed cause finally comes to
trial").
20 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy ... trial . . ").
2' See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) ("[C]ontinuances, particu-
larly if they are repeated, work against the important values implicit in the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505
F.2d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 1974) ("[T]here are decided limitations on [the use of a continuance]
stemming from a defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial."), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975).
2' See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Courts have considered a change of venue
in two situations: (1) where continuances and voir dire have been shown to be unsuccessful
in selecting an impartial jury, see United States v. Cotton, No. 68-CR-113 (E.D. Wis. June
11, 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 45 (1970), reprinted in part in Transcript Dismissing
Federal Indictment-Milwaukee 14, 28 GuiLD PRAC. 101, 102 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Transcript], or (2) where pretrial publicity has been so pervasive and prejudicial that these
remedies are found to be per se inadequate to assure an impartial jury, see Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963).
23 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
24 Id. at 724-25.
25 Id. at 726-27.
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to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the
crimes with which he was later to be charged. . . [a]ny subse-
quent court proceedings [in the venue] could be but a hollow
formality."2"
Defendants faced with a partial jury in the district in which
the crime was committed will usually waive their right to venue by
moving under Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure for a change of venue. A defendant may, however, stand on
his right to venue and insist on the selection of an impartial jury
from the district in which the crime was committed; if he does, his
right to an impartial jury (which can only be protected by a change
of venue in this situation) will conflict with his right to venue.
Lower federal courts have refused to order a change of venue when
the defendant does not request one, on the theory that the right to
venue is an absolute right of the defendant that only he can
waive.28 These courts have offered two justifications for this con-
clusion. First, some courts have reasoned that since the sixth
amendment right to venue is intended to protect the accused
against inconvenience and prejudice, only the defendant should be
able to waive this right.29 Other courts have relied on Rules 18 and
21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide
that the trial shall take place in the district where the crime was
committed unless the defendant moves for a change of venue.30
26 Id. at 726.
27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) (quoted in relevant part supra note 6).
28 See, e.g., United States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761 (11th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975);
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952); see also 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note
2, § 341, at 245 (because of constitutional limitations on venue, federal government "cannot
move for transfer nor can the court order transfer to another district on [its] own motion").
But cf. United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting district
court's creation of judicial-convenience exception to defendant's right to venue, but leaving
open possibility that "a defendant's right to venue is not absolute").
29 See, e.g., United States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761-62 (11th Cir. 1984); cf. Dela-
ney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952) (right to venue is solely intended to
benefit defendant). For a criticism of this view, see infra notes 56-84 and accompanying
text.
SO See, e.g., United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115, 116-17 (D.N.D.
1976); see also Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 523 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
("Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows defendants to obtain changes
of venue in order to get fair and impartial trial. No rule or statute grants such a privilege to
the United States.").
The federal rules themselves are based on the assumption that the sixth amendment
requires that only the defendant be able to waive his right to venue. See FED. R. CRIK P.
'21(a) advisory committee note ("[Rule 21(a)] provides for a change of venue only on defen-
dant's motion and does not extend the same right to the prosecution, since the defendant
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B. The Case Law
Once it is assumed that only the defendant can move for a
change of venue, a court is faced with the task of reconciling the
conflict that may arise when a defendant insists on both his right
to venue and his right to an impartial jury. In doing so, lower fed-
eral courts have developed two approaches: (1) dismissing the case
and (2) creating an implicit presumption that the jury in the dis-
trict where the crime was committed is impartial." Neither solu-
tion, however, withstands analysis.
1. Dismissal of the Case. At least one federal court has held
that the sixth amendment requires that the case be dismissed
when a defendant stands on his venue right in the face of publicity
that will result in a partial jury.32 In United States v. Cotton,3" the
has a constitutional right to a trial in the district where the offense was committed.") (cita-
tions omitted). For a discussion of the relationship between these rules and the problem
examined in this comment, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
S In addition to the court-ordered change of venue proposed by this comment, see
infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text, courts confronted with the conflict between a
defendant's right to venue and his right to an impartial jury might have considered two
other approaches: a court-ordered waiver either of the right to a speedy trial or the right to
trial by jury. A court-ordered waiver of a defendant's right to a speedy trial would be inap-
propriate: although the defendant's partial responsibility for the delay has been held to jus-
tify extending the constitutionally permissible period of delay, see, e.g., United States v.
Askew, 584 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States
v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139, 1145 & n. 5 (5th Cir. 1978), the Supreme Court has not held that
this factor is by itself sufficient to justify every delay, see, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 533 (1972) ("We regard none of the four factors [length of delay, reason for the delay,
the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant] as either a necessary
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.").
Neither have courts used the second alternative-a court-ordered bench trial-to solve
the conflict. Because a defendant's right to trial by jury is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930) (framers intended that "the right of trial by jury should
remain inviolable"), the Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of a valid consent
the district court cannot proceed except with a jury," Patton, 281 U.S. at 299. In fact, the
Court has considered the right to a jury trial to be so important that a defendant's waiver of
this right will not be effective without the consent of the court and the government. See
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-37 (1965) (upholding the constitutionality of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 23(a) that requires such consent). As a result, lower federal courts have not adopted
a court-ordered waiver of a defendant's right to a jury trial as a solution to this problem.
'3 United States v. Cotton, No. 68-CR-113 (E.D. Wis. June 11, 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 397 U.S. 45 (1970), reprinted in part in Transcript, supra note 22; cf. Wright,
supra note 3, at 435, 438 (in the rare case where pretrial publicity renders a fair trial of the
accused "impossible under any circumstances or under any safeguards," the case should be
dismissed). See generally Stanga, supra note 18, at 22-23 (discussing the use of dismissals
when other measures have failed to cure problems caused by prejudice in the community). A
few other district courts have also adopted the dismissal-of-the-case approach in such situa-
tions but their decisions have been reversed on appeal. Ste, e.g., United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, 369 F. Supp. 1396, 1404 (E.D.N.C. 1973), rev'd, 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974),
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defendants had been accused of breaking into a Selective Service
office in Milwaukee and burning draft records in order to protest
the Vietnam War. This case, known as the trial of the "Milwaukee
14," generated extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity.3 4 After con-
ducting an exhaustive voir dire of 142 potential jurors, the district
court concluded that the adverse pretrial publicity prevented the
defendants from receiving "a completely fair and impartial" trial
in the Eastern District of Wisconsin at that time. 5 Because the
defendants had refused to move for a change of venue and because
the grant of a continuance would violate their right to a speedy
trial, the court held that the case had to be dismissed. 6
Other courts have been reluctant to dismiss cases in such situ-
ations.37 Their reluctance can be justified on two grounds. First,
the dismissal approach is based on the conclusion that when two
constitutional rights come into conflict, the defendant cannot be
forced to waive one of them. The Supreme Court, however, has
generally concluded that the government may condition the exer-
cise of one constitutional right on the relinquishment of another if
this would not significantly impair the purposes underlying each
right.3 Under the testimonial-waiver doctrine, for example, the
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); cf. United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885,
933 (D. Vt.) (suggesting the availability of dismissal where an impartial jury cannot be ob-
tained), rev'd, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962).
" No. 68-CR-113 (E.D. Wis. June 11, 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 45 (1970), re-
printed in part in Transcript, supra note 22.
3" See Transcript, supra note 22, at 102, 105; see also 1970 Wis. L. REv. 209, 209-10
(discussing the pretrial publicity the case received).
11 Transcript, supra note 221 at 105.
36 Id. at 102-05.
1, See, e.g., United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 1974)
(discussed infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975);
United States v. Delaney, 199 F.2d 107, 111-12 (1st Cir. 1952) (concluding that it was not
reversible error to reject a motion for dismissal because the "publicity was [not] so perma-
nent, and ineradicable by mere lapse of time, that the court should have recognized the
impossibility of a fair trial ever being held at any time within the foreseeable future");
United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 77-78 (D.D.C. 1979) (dismissal not considered
because defendant had moved neither for a continuance nor a change of venue); United
States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dismissal rejected because prej-
udicial publicity "unlikely . . . to have any lasting influence"); cf. United States ex rel.
Means v. Solem, 457 F. Supp. 1256, 1261-65 (D.S.D. 1978) (in habeas corpus case, examina-
tion of several thousand pages of voir dire transcripts convinced court that petitioner had
not established his inability to get a fair trial even though state trial court had dismissed
charges arising out of the same incident).
11 In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court adopted an
absolute approach, in a case involving a conflict between the defendant's ability to assert his
fourth amendment right to have evidence suppressed and his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination, on the ground that it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another," id. at 394. In subsequent cases, however,
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Court has concluded that a defendant who exercises his constitu-
tional right to testify in his own defense must relinquish his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to
cross-examination reasonably related to his direct testimony. 9 The
Court has justified this conclusion on the ground that giving a de-
fendant "immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has
himself put in dispute.... would make of the Fifth Amendment
not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclos-
ure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to
tell."40 In other words, when different constitutional rights come
into conflict, the Court has resolved the tension, not by creating a
per se rule that a defendant must be guaranteed both rights, but
by examining the purposes underlying these rights and adopting
the approach that best accommodates the purposes of each one.
Another objection to the Cotton dismissal approach is that it
imposes substantial costs on society by frustrating the important
societal interest in trying people who have been accused of com-
mitting crimes.41 This problem is particularly acute in cases of ex-
the Court has abandoned the Simmons per se rule in favor of a balancing approach that
focuses on an examination of the underlying purposes of each constitutional right. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1980) (because the "Constitution does not forbid
'every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging
the exercise of constitutional rights,'" the proper approach is to determine whether the
compelled election would significantly impair any of the policies underlying the rights in-
volved) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)); McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) ("The threshold question is whether compelling the election im-
pairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."). For different
approaches to the problem presented by a conflict between the constitutional rights of a
defendant, see Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on
the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. Rv. 741, 753-58 (1981) (arguing that the constitution-
ality of a compelled election is best resolved by simply "balancing the state's interest in
compelling the election against the individual's interest in being Xelleved of the election");
White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in Capital Cases,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 950-58 (1983) (concluding that the proper approach is "to
assess whether the two rights involved in the compelled election are incompatible in the
sense that the defendant's exercise of both will have the effect of diminishing the scope
which should be afforded at least one of the two rights") (footnote omitted).
39 See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-57 (1956); see also Jenkins v. Ander-
son, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) ("Once a defendant decides to testify, '[t]he interests of the
other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become
relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of
the privilege against self-incrimination.' ") (quoting Brown, 356 U.S. at 156). See generally
EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 132 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing the testimonial-
waiver doctrine).
40 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1956).
41 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 n.16 (1972) (noting that the "overzeal-
ous application of [the dismissal] remedy would infringe 'the societal interest in trying peo-
ple accused of crime' ") (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966)); infra
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tensive pretrial publicity because dismissing these cases will often
result in the freeing of those defendants whom society would most
like to see tried. In addition, frequent grants of dismissal in cases
where there has been adverse pretrial publicity would create an
incentive for defendants to refuse to take measures that would pre-
vent jury partiality: defendants who would ordinarily move for a
change of venue in order to avoid the risk of a partial jury might
instead insist on their right to venue in the hope that their cases
would be dismissed.
2. Presumption of Impartiality. In order to avoid the
problems created by dismissing the case, most lower federal courts
have responded to the conflict created by a defendant who asserts
both his right to venue and his right to an impartial jury by
presuming that if the defendant refuses to move for a change of
venue, the jury in the district where the crime was committed is
impartial.42 In United States v. Abbott Laboratories,43 for exam-
ple, the defendants had been prosecuted in the Eastern District of
North Carolina for the distribution in interstate commerce of
adulterated and misbranded drugs. Prior to trial, the media had
run numerous inflammatory stories accusing the defendants of
causing the deaths of individuals who had used the contaminated
drugs.44 The district court concluded that the pretrial publicity
had caused such prejudice within the district that voir dire and a
continuance could not ensure the selection of an impartial jury.45
Because the defendants had opposed a change of venue, the dis-
trict court held that the sixth amendment required the case to be
dismissed. 6
In reversing the district court's decision to dismiss the case,
the Fourth Circuit addressed the problem of a defendant who ref-
notes 56-84 and accompanying text (arguing that the sixth amendment right to venue is in
part intended to protect the government's interest in trying those accused of committing'
crimes); cf. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413 (1984) (noting that the exclusionary
rule, by allowing some guilty defendants to go free, imposes a "substantial" cost on society);
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982) (in double jeopardy cases, "society would pay too
high a price 'were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect
sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction' ") (quoting
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
42 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 37.
43 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
44 For example, a local television station had broadcast a news report stating that nine
deaths and four hundred illnesses had been attributed to contaminated drugs manufactured
by the defendants' company. 505 F.2d at 568-69.
45 United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 369 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (E.D.N.C. 1973),
rev'd, 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
41 369 F. Supp. at 1404-05.
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uses to waive his right to venue despite the existence of pervasive
prejudice against him in the district where the crime was commit-
ted.47 Although the court suggested that a dismissal might be
proper in cases where "prejudicial pretrial publicity is so wide-
spread and pervasive that a change of venue would be ineffective
to assure a defendant a fair trial, '48 it nevertheless concluded that
a defendant who has "unused means" to protect his right to an
impartial jury should not be granted a dismissal unless he makes
"a conclusive showing that the unused means would be ineffec-
tive. e49 The necessary result of the holding in Abbott is that defen-
dants must show not only that they could not receive a trial by an
impartial jury in the district where the crime was committed but
also that they could not receive one in any other district in the
country even if they did move for a change of venue. If they cannot
make such a showing, they must be tried in the original district.
Since cases of nationwide prejudice are extremely rare,50 a defen-
dant's refusal to move for a change of venue would in effect be
dispositive of the question whether an impartial jury could be se-
lected in the district where the crime was committed.
Under the presumption-of-impartiality approach, courts have
resolved the conflict between the right to an impartial jury and the
right to venue by in effect "waiving," without the defendant's con-
sent, the right to an impartial jury. This result can be criticized on
two grounds. First, the presumption-of-impartiality approach rests
on the premise that a defendant's right to venue, but not his right
to an impartial jury, is an absolute right of the defendant that only
47 505 F.2d at 571-73.
4 Id. at 571-72 (discussing Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)).
" 505 F.2d at 572:
Although a change of venue under Rule 21 cannot be imposed on a defendant against
his will, the availability of a change of venue as a corrective device undergirds the
requirement that a defendant, who declines to request a change of venue but who seeks
dismissal of an indictment against him because of allegedly prejudicial pretrial public-
ity, demonstrate the existence of actual prejudice far more convincingly than was done
in the case at bar. A defendant who has unused means to protect his rights should not
lightly be granted the extreme remedy of dismissal of the charges against him on less
than a conclusive showing that the unused means would be ineffective.
"o Even in a case involving some of the Watergate defendants, United States v. Halde-
man, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the majority and the dissent disagreed about whether
nationwide prejudice existed. The majority concluded that a change of venue would have
been of "only doubtful value" because prejudice against the defendants was nationwide. Id.
at 64 n.43. The dissent, however, relied on a series of surveys showing that while 93% of the
Washington, D.C., population had heard about the indictments and 73% had formed an
opinion as to the defendants' guilt or innocence, only 50% in nearby Richmond, Virginia,
and 43% nationwide had formed an opinion. Id. at 144-45 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). This
suggests that cases of nationwide prejudice are very rare.
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he can waive. As will be shown below, however, this assumption is
unjustified in light of the purposes of the right to venue.
Moreover, the presumption-of-impartiality approach is partic-
ularly troubling because it requires the "waiver" of the right to an
impartial jury, which is central to the fair and accurate disposition
of criminal proceedings,5 in order to protect the right to venue,
which only indirectly ensures the fairness and accuracy of the trial
by preventing the government from unduly inconveniencing the
defendant or engaging in "jury-shopping."52 In Irvin v. Dowd,53 for
example, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of an impar-
tial jury:
In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" ju-
rors. . . . "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process." . . . In the ultimate analysis, only the jury
can strip a man of his liberty or his life. In the language of
Lord Coke, a juror must be as "indifferent as he stands un-
sworne." . . . His verdict must be based upon the evidence
developed at the trial.54
By creating a presumption of impartiality in the district where the
crime was committed, these courts have resolved the tension be-
tween these two rights at the expense of the fairness and accuracy
of the trial.
II. A REEXAMINATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VENUE
REQUIREMENT
In resolving the problem presented by a defendant who insists
on his right to venue in circumstances in which a change of venue
is necessary to protect his right to an impartial jury, both ap-
51 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551-55 (1976) (right to" 'trial
by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice'" and includes
the right to impartial jurors) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968));
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971) (" 'the right to jury trial guarantees to the
criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial ... jurors' ") (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[The right to trial by an impartial jury] is a right essential to the preservation
and enjoyment of all other rights, providing a necessary means of safeguarding personal
liberties against government oppression.").
52 See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
53 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
5Id. at 722 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); EDWARD COKE, A COM-
MENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155b (15th ed. London 1794) (1st ed. London 1628)) (citations
omitted).
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proaches-dismissing the case and the presumption of impartial-
ity-have assumed that the sixth amendment confers an absolute
right to venue that only the defendant can waive.5 Further analy-
sis of the history and purposes of the sixth amendment right to
venue shows, however, that this assumption is incorrect.
A. The Purpose of the Sixth Amendment Right to Venue
Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution requires that
"[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be ... held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed." 56 Although this provision generated little discussion
during the Constitutional Convention, it was probably a response
to the English practice in the late 1760's and 1770's of transporting
colonists to another colony or to England for trial.57 The colonists
had vehemently protested that this practice prevented defendants
from presenting an adequate defense and allowed the English gov-
ernment to obtain juries sympathetic to its position.5 8 In order to
correct this abuse, the article III venue provision limited the fed-
eral government's choice of forum for trial to the state in which the
crime was committed.
At the ratifying conventions, however, this provision was se-
verely criticized. 59 First, opponents argued that it was inadequate
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2, cl. 3.
5 See, e.g., Kershen, supra note 2, at 805-08; Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscen-
ity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 408-10 (1967).
8 For example, the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1769 issued the following
proclamation:
[Hiow truly deplorable must be the Case of a wretched American, who having incurred
the Displeasure of anyone in Power is dragged from his native Home, and his dearest
domestic Connections, thrown into Prison, not to await his Trial before a Court, Jury
or judges, from a Knowledge of whom he is encouraged to hope for speedy justice; but
to exchange his Imprisonment in his own Country for fetters among Strangers? Con-
veyed to a distant Land, where no Friends, no Relation, will alleviate his Distress, or
minister to his Necessities, and where no Witness can be found to testify to his
Innocence....
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 1766-1769, at 216 (J. Kennedy ed. 1906); see also 1
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 210 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971) (Samuel Adams
protested that "whether condemned or acquitted [the accused] will probably be ruined by
the expense attending the tryal, and his long absence from his Family and business.").
89 Critics of the article I provision offered two other objections. First, they argued
that because federal appellate courts would have the power to review findings of both law
and fact, the verdict of an impartial jury could be set aside with impunity. See, e.g., 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrru-
TION 540 (J. Elliott ed. Washington 1854) (1st ed. Washington 1830) (statement of Patrick
Henry at the Virginia ratification convention) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOTr's DEBATES]. Sec-
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to protect a federal criminal defendant against the inconvenience
and expense associated with presenting a defense far away from his
place of residence.60 For example, Abraham Holmes, a delegate to
the Massachusetts ratifying convention, argued that a defendant
"may, by reason of the distance of his residence from the place of
the trial, be incapable of making such defense as he is, in justice,
entitled to, and which he could avail himself of, if his trial was in
the same county where the crime is said to have been commit-
ted."61 In addition, the critics also observed that this provision was
so broadly drawn as to allow the federal government to engage in
the "jury-shopping" that the provision was in part intended to pre-
vent:6 2 because "[the defendant] may be tried in any part of the
state," the government "can hang anyone they please, by having a
jury to suit their purpose."6 " In order to protect a defendant from
the possibility of inconvenience and prejudice, they proposed that
the venue for federal trials be limited to the county in which the
crime was committed. 4
In response to these criticisms, James Madison argued at the
Virginia ratifying convention that a narrow venue provision might
completely .prevent the government from trying the defendant. For
example, he observed that in the event of a local rebellion,6 5 it
might be impossible for the federal government to summon a jury
from the venue.6 Others, however, simply defended the article III
ond, they objected to the absence of a provision for jury trial in civil cases. See, e.g., 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 525-26 (M. Jensen ed.
1976) (statement of John Smilie at the Pennsylvania ratification convention) [hereinafter
cited as DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. See generally Comment, supra note 57, at 410.
60 See, e.g., 2 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 59, at 633-34 (minority criticism at
the Pennsylvania ratification convention).
61 2 ELLIoTT's DEBATES, supra note 59, at 110 (emphasis deleted).
6- See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
63 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 568-69 (statement of Mr. Grayson at Virginia
ratification convention). But see id. at 560 (John Marshall denigrated the fear that the fed-
eral government would "jury-shop" on the ground that the change of venue would not
"carr[y] [a man] from a federal to an anti-federal corner, (and vice versa) where men are
ready to destroy him.").
6 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 568-69 (Patrick Henry arguing at
the Virginia ratification in favor of a jury of the vicinage); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 59, at 634 (minority at the Pennsylvania ratification convention supported a proposal
providing for an impartial "jury of the neighborhood or country").
65 Madison's fear that an insurrection might prevent the government from trying a de-
fendant probably resulted from Shays' Rebellion. In 1786, Daniel Shays led a rebellion in
Massachusetts demanding the issuance of more paper money and the passage of debtor re-
lief laws. For four months, this rebellion "overawe[d] the courts and deffied] the laws." 1
FRANCIS THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 286-87 (1970).
66 It was objected, yesterday, that there was no provision for a jury from the vicinage.
If it could have been done with safety, it would not have been opposed. It might so
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provision on the grounds that a narrower venue provision could
not be drafted because of the great diversity of state practices in
selecting juries6 and that jurors from the defendant's neighbor-
hood were no longer necessary in a system in which juries acted as
impartial weighers of evidence presented at trial and not as judges
of character and personality.6
8
During the first session of Congress, Madison proposed a con-
stitutional amendment that would have met the objections of the
critics of the article III provision without sacrificing the govern-
ment's interest in trying criminal defendants. He suggested that
the trial of all crimes (except impeachment and certain military
offenses) "shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vici-
nage . . . provided that in cases of crimes committed within any
county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a gen-
eral insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized in
some other county of the same State, as near as may be to the seat
of the offense."6 9
happen that a trial would be impracticable in the country. Suppose a rebellion in a
whole district; would it not be impossible to get a jury? . . . It must be, therefore, left
to the discretion of the legislature to modify it according to circumstances. This is a
complete and satisfactory answer.
3 ELLiOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 537. In a proposed amendment to the Constitution,
the New York ratification convention also expressed concern about the possibility of a local
rebellion preventing the trial of persons accused of crime:
[T]he trial of all crimes cognizable by the judiciary of the United States. . . should be
. . . by an impartial jury of the county where the crime was committed ... . But in
cases of crimes.., committed within any county in which a general insurrection may
prevail.., the inquiry and trial may be in such county as the Congress shall by law
direct; which county.., should be as near as conveniently may be to that county in
which the crime may have been committed ....
1 id. at 328.
Others, however, disagreed with Madison's conclusion that the danger of an insurrec-
tion prevented the venue provision from being defined more narrowly.
I beg leave to differ from my honorable friends in answering this objection. They said
that, in case of a general rebellion, the jury was to be drawn from some other part of
the country. I know that this practice is sanctified by the usages in England. But I
always thought that this was one of those instances to which the nation, though alive to
liberty, had unguardedly submitted.
3 id. at 574 (statement of Governor Randolph at Virginia ratification convention); see also
id. at 545 (Patrick Henry argued that "[j]uries from the vicinage being not secured, this
right is in reality sacrificed. All is gone. And why? Because a rebellion may arise. . . . I trust
the honorable gentlemen. . . will be sorry for this observation.").
V See, e.g., F. HELLER, supra note 2, at 27.
See, e.g., 2 ELLoTT'S DEBATES, supra note 59, at 112-13 (statement of Christopher
Gore at Massachusetts ratification convention); 3 id. at 546-47 (statement of Edmund Pen-
dleton at Virginia ratification convention); 4 id. at 150 (statement of Governor Johnston at
North Carolina ratification convention).
' 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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After some initial opposition,"0 the House of Representatives
adopted Madison's proposal with several minor modifications: (1)
the word "county" was changed to the less definite word "place";
(2) the condition which permitted a change of venue was simply an
"insurrection," not a "general insurrection"; and (3) venue could
be changed to anywhere within the state, not necessarily "as near
as may be to the seat of the offence."' By giving courts more free-
dom to choose where the trial would occur, these modifications in-
dicate that the House of Representatives accepted Madison's con-
cern about the dangers of a narrow, inflexible venue provision.
The Senate initially eliminated the entire venue provision
from Madison's proposed amendment.7 2 Although no record of the
Senate's discussion survives,7 3 a letter from James Madison to Ed-
mund Pendleton states that the Senate had eliminated the venue
provision on the grounds that the term "vicinage" was "either too
vague or too strict a term, too vague if depending on limits to be
fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if limited to the County"
and that the different state practices in selecting juries prevented
an agreement on the proper geographical area.7" This suggests that
the Senate rejected Madison's venue provision not because it dis-
agreed about the importance of protecting the government's inter-
est in trying persons accused of crime but rather because it feared
that his proposal was too narrow to achieve this purpose and be-
cause it would also require the restructuring of jury-selection pro-
cedures in many states.75
70 Representative Burke of South Carolina proposed that the word "vicinage" be re-
placed by "district or county within which the offense was committed," but his proposal was
apparently defeated. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 789 (J. Gales ed. 1789); see also Comment, supra
note 57, at 411.
71 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 788-89 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
72 See Kershen, supra note 2, at 822.
73 Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania, whose journal is the principal source of
information on Senate proceedings during the first session of Congress, was ill during the
period when this amendment was debated. See F. HELLER, supra note 2, at 31.
74 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), reprinted in 12
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 419 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland ed. 1979). In another letter,
Madison observed:
[The Senate] sent back the plan of amendments with some alterations which strike in
my opinion at the most salutary articles. In many of the States juries even in criminal
cases, are taken from the State at large-in others, from districts of consider[able] ex-
tent-in a very few from the County alone.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 402.
75 Cf. Kershen, supra note 2, at 823-25 (suggesting that Federalist senators might have
rejected Madison's proposal for fear that if" 'vicinage' meant that jurors would be [selected]
from the inhabitants of the county where the crime was committed, . . . a local leader of
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After the dispute was referred to a conference committee,
Congress agreed to a compromise, which eventually became the
sixth amendment, under which the trial of federal criminal defen-
dants would be "by an impartial jury of the State and district...
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.'" Al_
though the text of the sixth amendment does not expressly incor-
porate either Madison's proposal or his concern that the govern-
ment might not be able to try criminal defendants in certain
circumstances, the available evidence suggests that Congress had
adopted this formulation as a compromise between Madison's pro-
posal and the original article III provision in order to protect both
the defendant's and the government's interests.7
The Judiciary Act of 1789,7s which was passed one day before
the Bill of Rights was sent to the states for ratification, also sup-
ports this interpretation of the sixth amendment.79 In section 29 of
the Judiciary Act, Congress required that all capital crimes" be
tried in the county where the crime was committed but included
an exception that allowed a change of venue if there was "great
inconvenience" in the county.8 1 In such a case, the trial would take
place outside the county (but within the state), and at least twelve
prospective jurors would have to be summoned from the county
where the crime had been committed. Hence, in cases involving
capital crimes, Congress had considered Madison's fear that a nar-
row venue requirement would inadequately protect the govern-
ment's interest in trying criminal defendants and adopted his
solution.
rebellion might be protected by local jurors" and out of a belief that the art. III provision
had been sufficient protection for the defundant's right to venue).
76 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
77 Cf. Heller, supra note 2, at 93 ("The wording of the amendment represented a com-
promise between the localist tendencies of those who wished to restrict vicinage to the
county and the Federalists who urged a minimum of restraint in the exercise of the judicial
power of the national government.").
71 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
71 See, e.g., Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (relying on the Judi-
ciary Act as a "contemporary construction" of the sixth amendment). For a detailed discus-
sion of the relationship between the sixth amendment and the Judiciary Act of 1789, see
Kershen, supra note 2, at 844-60.
go Capital crimes included treason, murder, piracy, robbery on the high seas, accessory
before the fact to piracy, counterfeiting, and uttering a counterfeit public security. Act of
Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
81 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88. The term "great inconvenience"
has been interpreted to include rebellions in the county, see United States v. Insurgents, 26
F. Cas. 498, 499 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 15,442); Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 846 (C.C.D. Pa.
1799) (No. 5126), as well as other factors that inconvenience the government, see Orfield,
Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. Prrr. L. RE V. 375, 404 (1956).
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Moreover, in cases involving noncapital crimes,82 Congress
went even further and provided that the trial would take place in
the district where the crime was committed."3 Since Congress (with
two exceptions) defined the boundaries of the districts as coexten-
sive with the boundaries of the states,84 venue was defined even
more broadly than it had been in Madison's proposal. By equating
districts with states, Congress had attempted to ensure that the
government's interest in trying a defendant would not be sacrificed
to the defendant's right to venue.
The history and purposes of the sixth amendment therefore
suggest that the right to venue is not an absolute right of the de-
fendant. While the sixth amendment right to venue was intended
to protect a defendant against inconvenience and prejudice, this
was not its only purpose; the framers also intended to protect the
government's interest in trying a person accused of crime in an
impartial environment.
B. A Court-Ordered Change of Venue
Although the framers reconciled the right to venue with the
right to an impartial jury, social change has resurrected the tension
between these rights. The development of the mass media has had
a significant impact on the courts' ability to impanel an impartial
jury in the district where the crime was committed. 5 Reduction in
the size of judicial districts has also increased the risk that an im-
partial jury cannot be found in the district.8 6
82 Noncapital crimes included misprision of treason, misprision of felony, manslaugh-
ter, accessory after the fact to piracy, stealing or falsifying court records or court processes,
larceny, embezzlement, perjury, bribery, obstruction of court processes, and receiving stolen
property. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
83 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88; see also Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 106 (1923).
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73, 73. (Massachusetts and Virginia were
each divided into two districts).
15 See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 19, at 821 ("The all-pervasive nature of modern mass
media renders the traditional instruments for insuring a fair trial of questionable value.");
cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("In these days of swift, widespread and diverse
methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the
public in the vicinity . . ").
88 In order to make trials more convenient for defendants and to alleviate the problem
of crowded dockets, see Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and the History of Their
Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139, 148, 172 (1966), Congress has divided some states into a number of
judicial districts: at present, twenty-four states have more than one district, with three
states having four districts, nine states having three districts, and twelve states having two
districts, see 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 81-131 (West Supp. 1985).
Improvements in transportation have had a functionally similar effect. "In terms of
time and distance the present districts are therefore much smaller than those established by
[52:729
Venue and Impartial Jury Rights
An examination of the underlying purposes of the sixth
amendment suggests a resolution of the conflict between the right
to venue and the right to an impartial jury: the trial should be held
in the district where the crime was committed, but if prejudicial
publicity prevents the trial of that defendant in that district, the
court should have the power to order a change of venue to another
district.8 7 Although the framers of the sixth amendment could not
anticipate the role of the mass media in preventing the selection of
an impartial jury in the district, a court-ordered change of venue
best accommodates the purposes underlying the right to venue and
the right to an impartial jury.
Since the defendant will be tried by an impartial jury in the
district to which the case is transferred, this approach guarantees
the right to an impartial jury. Moreover, the purposes underlying
the right to venue are not significantly impaired. First, the societal
interest in trying individuals accused of crimes" is vindicated be-
cause the defendant will be tried in another district and may not
insist on two rights simply for the purpose of preventing the gov-
ernment from prosecuting him at all. Second, the framers' con-
cerns about possible inconvenience and prejudice to the defendant
are not as strongly implicated today by a change of venue outside
the district. While a court-ordered change of venue would still in-
convenience the defendant to some extent, it is much easier for
him to undertake his defense in another district today than it
would have been in 1789.89 It is also important to remember that
even those trials authorized in 1789 imposed significant costs and
inconvenience on defendants: first, the state-wide districts estab-
the apportionment of the Judiciary Act of 1789." F. H.LLER, supra note 2, at 94. At the time
the Constitution was drafted, a trip from New York to Boston took five days, a journey from
Boston to Savannah took 222 days, and the distant points of the interior were a four to five
weeks' trip from almost any point on the east coast. Id.
67 Under state constitutional provisions similar to the sixth amendment venue provi-
sion, courts have disagreed on the question of whether a change of venue can be ordered,
without the defendant's consent, in such a situation. Compare, e.g., Mast v. Superior Court,
102 Ariz. 225, 226, 427 P.2d 917, 918 (1967) (court-ordered change of venue upheld because
right to an impartial jury of the county secured by the state constitution is "conditioned
upon the possibility of empanelling 'an impartial jury' in that county"), with, e.g., Blume v.
State, 244 Ind. 121, 125 n.2, 189 N.E.2d 568, 570 n.2 (1963) (because state constitution pro-
vides accused with the right to trial by an impartial jury of the county, "[ilt is elementary
that there is [no authorization for the prosecution or court] to take a change of venue from
the county"). See generally 14 S.D.L. REv. 396 (1969) (discussing the circumstances in which
a court-ordered change of venue does not infringe the right to venue under state
constitutions).
See supra notes 41, 65-84 and accompanying text.
"* See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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lished by Congress in 1789 often required defendants to travel con-
siderable distances;90 and second, since the sixth amendment guar-
antees a defendant the right to be tried in the district where the
crime was committed, not in the district where he resides, he still
might be tried far away from his home and his family.91 This sug-
gests that while the framers were concerned about the possibility
that defendants might be inconvenienced by trial far away from
their residences, this factor was not the primary purpose of the
right to venue. Finally, the costs and inconvenience imposed on the
defendant by a court-ordered change of venue can be reduced by
requiring the court to transfer the case to the nearest district
where an impartial jury can be selected.9 2 In many cases, this re-
quirement will result in the transfer of the case to another district
within the state (if it is a multidistrict state) or to a district in an
adjoining state.93
The danger of jury prejudice against a defendant from an ad-
joining state has probably diminished because the development of
a well-established national identity in the last two hundred years
90 See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text.
I' See, e.g., Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1964)
("home" of the offender does not determine venue); Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631,
634 (1961) (trial can be "at a distant place" because the "'constitutional requirement is as
to the locality of the offense and not the personal presence of the offender' ") (quoting Ar-
mour Packing Co. v. United States, 205 U.S. 56, 76 (1908)); Johnston v. United States, 351
U.S. 215, 220-21 (1956) ("[V]ariation ... [from the rule that the situs of the trial is deter-
mined by the vicinage of the crime and not the residence of the accused] for convenience of
the prosecution or the accused is not justified.").
92 This was indeed the limitation included in proposals governing venue that preceded
the ratification of the sixth amendment. See supra note 66 (proposed amendment from New
York ratifying convention); supra text accompanying note 69 (amendment proposed by
James Madison).
If the defendant shows that there exists in the district to which the case has been trans-
ferred "so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial," FED. R. CRiM. P. 21(a), he is of course entitled to move for a change of venue to
another district.
93 Empirical studies have suggested that impartial juries can usually be found some-
where within a state. See, e.g., FAIR TuAL STANDARDS, supra note 12, at 120-21, 183-84 ("[I]t
is frequently true that a case which will receive intensive coverage in one locality will
scarcely be noticed in another, particularly when the state is a large one with more than one
principal city."). For example, a crime that has generated a lot of controversy in a primarily
rural district would probably not generate the same degree of publicity if it were transferred
to a large city in another district. See, e.g., id. at 184 ("[A]hmost all state criminal reporting
has much less prominence and uniqueness in the large cities studied than in the less urban
areas where the stories often originate."); Stanga, supra note 18, at 21 ("[C]hange of venue
[is an] effective remedy against community prejudice when the original forum is in a rural
area or a small town.") (footnote omitted); Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 34, 53 (1966) (publicity threatening jury impartiality
tends to be localized).
Venue and Impartial Jury Rights
has made it less likely that a jury from Maryland would convict a
defendant from Virginia solely on the ground that he was from
Virginia.9 4 The possibility still exists, however, that the govern-
ment might abuse the power to transfer the case outside the dis-
trict in order to shop for a jury that would be sympathetic to its
position. 5 This danger can be reduced in the present situation by
requiring the court to order a change of venue when it determines
that an impartial jury cannot be found in the district and the de-
fendant refuses to waive his right to venue. Since the court is a
neutral arbiter, not an adversarial party, this requirement will en-
sure that a change of venue is not ordered to obtain a tactical ad-
vantage for the government.
This approach-a court-ordered change of venue to another
district when an impartial jury cannot be selected in the district
where the crime was committed-more properly aligns the sixth
amendment rights to-venue and an impartial jury with the framers'
intent than does either of the judicial approaches discussed
above.96 Unlike the dismissal of all cases in which an impartial jury
cannot be found in the district, this approach would vindicate the
important societal interest in having an impartial trial of defen-
dants accused of crime. At the same time, this approach would not
dilute the defendant's right to an impartial jury, which is the es-
sence of a fair trial:97 the defendant will receive a trial by an im-
partial jury in the place to which the trial is transferred.
A final objection to a court-ordered change of venue is that it
would conflict with Rules 18 and 21(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, S which limit the right to move for a change of
venue to the defendant himself. A literal and strict application of
these rules, however, would be improper in this context. There is
no indication that the draftsmen of these procedural rules consid-
ered the possibility that an impartial jury could not be found in
the district where the crime was committed and nevertheless in-
tended for the case to be tried in that district.9 Most important,
" Cf. DAvm CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 252-53 (3d ed. 1982) (although local bias is the
common justification for diversity jurisdiction, there is little evidence of actual bias against
nonresident litigants in diversity cases).
" See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra notes 51, 53-54 and accompanying text.
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18, 21(a) (discussed supra note 30 and accompanying text).
"9 In fact, the draftsmen of Rule 21(a) expressly provided that only a defendant could
move for a change of venue because of their belief that the sixth amendment right to venue
requires this result. See supra note 30.
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as demonstrated above,100 a court-ordered change of venue is con-
stitutionally required in order to resolve the problem created by a
defendant who insists on his right to venue in cases in which a
change of venue is the only remedy that will ensure his right to an
impartial jury.
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the problem created by a crimi-
nal defendant's refusal to waive his right to trial in the district
where the crime was committed when a change of venue is neces-
sary to protect his right to an impartial jury. The approaches de-
veloped by the federal courts-dismissal of the case and dilution of
the impartial-jury requirement through the creation of a presump-
tion of impartiality-either infringe important societal interests or
improperly "waive," without the defendant's consent, the right to
an impartial jury. But these are not the only two options available.
Both approaches assume that a criminal defendant's right to venue
is an absolute right that only he can waive, but an examination of
the purposes of the sixth amendment suggests that the defendant's
right to venue was conditioned by the framers upon the ability of
the government to try the defendant in the venue. As a result, in
cases where an impartial jury cannot be selected in the district
where the crime was committed and the defendant refuses to move
for a change of venue, the appropriate solution is a court-ordered
change of venue to another district. Potential problems with this
approach-inconvenience to the defendant and the possibility that
the government might engage in "jury-shopping"-can best be
solved by requiring the court to determine when an impartial jury
cannot be found in the district and to transfer the case to the near-
est district where an impartial jury is likely to be found.
Scott Kafker
100 See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
